Abstract-To build a resilient and secure microgrid in the face of growing cyber-attacks and cyber-mistakes, we present a software-defined networking (SDN)-based communication network architecture for microgrid operations. We leverage the global visibility, direct networking controllability, and programmability offered by SDN to investigate multiple security applications, including self-healing communication network management, real-time and uncertainty-aware communication network verification, and specification-based intrusion detection. We also expand a novel cyber-physical testing and evaluation platform that combines a power distribution system simulator (for microgrid energy services) and an SDN emulator with a distributed control environment (for microgrid communications). Experimental results demonstrate that the SDN-based communication architecture and applications can significantly enhance the resilience and security of microgrid operations against the realization of various cyber threats.
Toward a Cyber Resilient and Secure Microgrid
Using Software-Defined Networking a campus microgrid at Illinois Institute of Technology (IIT) [1] has achieved a 6.58% reduction in yearly CO 2 emission (saving 3,457,818 kg), with a lower electricity price of 7¢ per kWh, while the average price in the Chicago area was 16.48¢ per kWh in 2015 [2] . Microgrids are increasingly adopting Internet technology to boost the communication and control efficiency, which subsequently opens a new frontier of cyber security in their operations. Current microgrids are typically designed to handle the failure of any physical component involved in energy generation or delivery. Many power grid applications, such as state estimation, automatic generation control, and economic dispatch, however, are in lack of inherent fault-tolerant capabilities in the faces of malicious cyber-attacks. Furthermore, a growing number of new applications are being utilized to guide and improve microgrid operations. It is therefore critical to re-examine the existing communication network architecture and application designs with a specific focus on their performance and resilience under cyber-attacks.
In this paper, we present a novel software-defined networking (SDN) based communication network architecture to enhance the cyber security and resilience of microgrid operations. SDN is a programmable open-source approach to designing, building, and managing communication networks [3] . Figure 1 depicts a multi-layered architecture of an SDN-enabled microgrid: Unlike the traditional communication paradigm, SDN decouples the network control from the forwarding functions in network devices, offloading its decision functions to logically centralized controller(s). As a result, we have an additional SDN control layer in the new microgrid architecture, which (1) provides high-level abstractions and application programming interfaces (APIs) for interacting with, managing, monitoring and programming the communication network that consists of supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) master/slaves, sensors, actuators, and networking devices; and (2) acts as an open platform that facilitates the development of innovative microgrid applications and services to dynamically configure and operate the communication network across a wide range of hardware including SDN-enabled and/or legacy devices.
The integration of SDN and microgrids introduces numerous benefits to communication network engineering, including but not limited to strictly defined primary and failover communication paths, end-to-end latency and bandwidth guarantee, real-time monitoring capability, and system-wide visualization. This paper particularly focuses on the additional opportunities of security and resilience enhancement that SDN offers to microgrids: Global visibility of the communication network enables detailed data visualization of microgrid communications (e.g., multi-pathing, capacity utilization, hotspot identification, and even individual application flows), and facilitates network management to reduce the attack surface; Logically centralized control provides a straightforward approach to deploy cost-effective security solutions (e.g., analyzers and notifiers of an intrusion detection system, communication network verifiers); Direct network control and programmability facilitates the integration with the existing microgrid control applications and allows more innovative applications to blossom. We investigate three such applications that will potentially become standard for microgrid communication networks: self-healing network management, communication network verification and specification-based intrusion detection (see Figure 1) .
The incorporation of SDN technologies in a microgrid is challenging because the mission-and time-critical nature of power delivery demands continuous system availability and strong real-time requirements. Therefore, a testing platform is needed by the research community to evaluate the impact of the new SDN-based architecture and applications on microgrids before production deployment. We developed DSSnet [4] , an SDN-based microgrid testbed that combines a power distribution system simulator with an SDN emulator through a virtual time system to enable scalable and high-fidelity evaluation. DSSnet has been used to model and simulate microgrid dynamic operations and control routines based on SDN-enabled communication networks, and to evaluate new SDN-based microgrid applications. In this work, we extend DSSnet to evaluate the security and performance impacts of new SDN-based applications (e.g., self-healing networking) in the microgrid environment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II overviews the benefits and challenges of integrating SDN to microgrids. Section III describes the design of an SDN-enabled campus microgrid. Section IV presents three innovative SDN applications for microgrid resilience and security enhancement. Section V describes DSSnet, a cyber-physical microgrid testbed combining power distribution system simulation and SDN emulation. Section VI presents detailed evaluation results of a self-healing microgrid application using DSSnet. Section VII discusses the related work. Section VIII concludes the paper with future work.
II. OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES OF USING SDN FOR MICROGRID RESILIENCE AND SECURITY ENHANCEMENT
This section describes the technical benefits and challenges of SDN-enabled microgrids. On one hand, SDN enables better system-wide situational awareness with global visibility, efficient communication network management through direct programmability, and effective cross-layer control with rich information from the communication network layer and the microgrid application layer. On the other hand, the missionand time-critical nature of electric power services imposes stringent real-time and resilient requirements for SDN-based application design and deployment. The main benefits include the following.
A. Cyber-Security/Cyber-Resilience SDN enhances the inherent capabilities of microgrids against cyber-attacks. One can leverage the global visibility offered by SDN to enable specification-based intrusion detections of anomaly at different locations, revealing highlycoordinated cyber-attacks to prevent potential disruptions to the physical infrastructure, i.e., ensure uninterrupted delivery of power. One can also leverage the dynamic programmability provided by SDN to mitigate implications of the identified attacks, such as (1) isolating compromised devices upon detection, (2) dropping malicious traffic closer to the attack sources, and (3) reconnecting sensors and meters to the communication network to preserve the sufficient observability of a microgrid. The dynamic programmability guarantees timely detection and rapid response to disturbances due to either accidental events or malicious attacks, or to enable on-demand path establishment for control commands to largely shrink attackers' operation time window over traditional network mechanisms which lack the programmability afforded by the centralized network management of SDN. In addition, SDN's standardized programmability enables straightforward (often simpler) implementations of existing attack detection algorithms and systems [5] , [6] over traditional networks.
B. Interoperability
Existing communication networks are built with many legacy and fragmented vendor equipment. SDN allows the realization of network function virtualization (NFV) by evolving and consolidating most middlebox equipment as network functions with virtualization technology, which can be moved to, or instantiated in, at various geolocations without having to install new equipment. In addition, SDN allows aggregation of distributed energy resources (DERs) that use different communication technologies with virtual networks through dynamic software configuration, and enables efficient ways of handling new services via NFV from the power system perspective, e.g., massive DER relocation to different virtual power plant (VPP) aggregations due to variable solar generation.
C. Quality of Service (QoS)
SDN enables finer-grained communication network flow statistics for real-time monitoring and QoS control mechanisms, which are useful for improving the efficiency and reliability of microgrid energy services. With the global visibility of the entire communication network, one can quickly compute an optimal routing path that observes QoS requirements and executes the adjustment by directly programming the network devices.
Despite the promising benefits, we should also be aware of the challenges arising from (1) the integration with the electric power infrastructure and microgrid monitoring and control systems, and (2) the additional security challenges brought by SDN. For example, malicious packet delay (e.g., rerouting of a data flow to a high-latency path) or selective packet drop (leading to packet re-transmissions) may look perfectly legitimate at the communication network layer, but could lead to synchronization issues, control degradation, and even microgrid destabilization [7] ; The unforeseen disruptions of SDN controllers can also severely interrupt the power supplies in a microgrid.
To address those issues, we can leverage recent advances in SDN security research, which mainly focus on security enforcement frameworks, to design our microgrid SDN controller and applications [8] . Various frameworks are discussed in Section VII. It is also essential to explore distributed controllers to mitigate the single-point-of-failure vulnerability. Recent advances in the distributed SDN application platform with a number of network-and device-centric high-level abstractions shed light on this issue [9] . Additionally, comparing with IT systems, microgrid control systems have simpler network dynamics, including relatively static topologies, pre-defined communication patterns, a limited number of protocols, and a stable user population. Therefore, it is easier to design cyber-security applications like intrusion detection, network verification and self-healing management than those traditional IT networks with details discussed in Section IV.
III. SDN-ENABLED CAMPUS MICROGRID DESIGN
We converted IIT's main campus in Chicago into an islandable microgrid as a successful outcome of the "Perfect Power Initiative" project funded by the U.S., Department of Energy [10] . IIT microgrid features a seven-loop highreliability power distribution system. A centralized microgrid master controller (MMC) is responsible for optimizing the microgrid operation cost while maintaining the microgridwide voltage and frequency stability. MMC coordinates the operation of on-site generation, storage, and building loads via the SCADA system. The states of DERs and other distribution system components are continuously monitored, aggregated and communicated to MMC. MMC communicates with various types of field devices through various communications protocols (e.g., Modbus, BACnet, DNP3). MMC also processes the real-time measurements and optimizes the microgrid-wide energy management.
The SDN technology brings advanced intelligence and close coordination among all the legacy and new devices (e.g., SCADA devices, sensors, actuators and various subcontrollers) that share the communication infrastructure. This requires a logically centralized SDN controller to monitor and control the communication network in real time to optimize performance and enable cyber-security and -resilience support. Currently, the microgrid control center that hosts MMC serves as an information hub at the microgrid application layer, which provides the ideal location to deploy the SDN controller. In fact, MMC and the SCADA controller play different roles in microgrid control and management and thus can be integrated as a more powerful MMC. For instance, the existing MMC coordinates the operation of on-site generation, storage, and building loads via the SCADA system, whereas the SDN controller is responsible for configuring and managing the communication network that is the backbone of the SCADA system. Figure 2 depicts the design of the SDN-enabled IIT microgrid, where a hierarchical SDN control approach is applied for the communication network. SDN controllers are implemented as an interlinking layer between the communication network and the microgrid applications. The SDN master controller is integrated with the existing MMC in the control center. Each local SDN controller is designed to focus on a subset of communication applications (e.g., PMU, building control, etc.) for fine-grain monitoring and control, and the local controllers are coordinated and supervised by the Master SDN controller. This control hierarchy reduces the performance overhead and makes the communication network more resilient to cyber-attacks and human errors.
The logically centralized control of SDN provides an ideal location to security solutions. It also advances more innovative applications to secure microgrid communications, such as self-healing network management, context-aware intrusion detection, global network verification, and many more.
The next section will focus on three applications that we investigate to enhance the resilience and security of the IIT microgrid.
IV. SDN APPLICATIONS IN A MICROGRID

A. Self-Healing Network Management
The SDN-based communication infrastructure enables us to develop a self-healing communication network application by exploiting the features of dynamic and programmable configuration offered by SDN to achieve resilience against cyber-attacks. New risk-mitigation techniques to self-heal the communication network with respect to the upper layer microgrid control applications include but are not limited to (1) strategically and quickly resetting and reconfiguring switches to establish new routes isolating suspicious devices in the microgrid, (2) establishing application-specific filtering in the switches located close to the attack sources, and (3) enabling on-demand path establishment for control commands to largely shrink the attacker's operation time window. In addition, the global visibility enables the self-healing application to mitigate the threats without negatively impacting the network-wide security policy and communication requirements of other microgrid applications sharing portions of the physical communication links.
We developed an SDN-based application to realize a selfhealing phasor measurement unit (PMU) network [11] . After detecting a cyber-attack, the SDN controller applies rapid configuration changes of the network switches to isolate the compromised PMUs to prevent further propagation of the attack; meanwhile, the controller quickly establishes paths for the disconnected yet uncompromised PMUs to restore the power system observability. In this paper, we further extend the solution into a two-stage self-healing scheme, which would be applied to other networked communication systems in a microgrid, such as the microgrid SCADA system. The failover paths are periodically optimized by the controller (e.g., minimal time to restore system connectivity/observability) and are updated in the switches to adapt to the evolving network traffic. More specifically, the first stage is to determine failover paths to be configured in the SDN switches. Historical measurements representing previous network dynamics collected by the SDN switches allow us to take a data-driven approach to predict the per-flow traffic volume and processing time on each switch. Several scenarios would be generated as the result of the data-driven approach, each of which indicates a different communication network condition. Accordingly, the first stage solves a scenario-based stochastic optimization problem by satisfying certain constraints (e.g., failed/unreliable link avoidance, hardware resource limitation, end-to-end latency requirement). The second stage functions after any cyberattack occurs. It checks whether the reconfiguration is the optimal one and computes a solution under the current communication network condition. We form another optimization problem in the second stage. The difference is that the first stage considers a set of hypothetical scenarios while the second stage utilizes the actual network traffic measured by the SDN switches at runtime. If a better solution is found, the application dynamically applies the new configuration to the underlying communication network. It is also critical that the same message is never handled by the rules that belong to two different schemes installed on the SDN switches along the communication path.
The centralized control provided by SDN and the dynamic programmability enables the self-healing strategy to run in a centralized location at the controller rather than traditional spanning tree algorithms which require distributed coordination. However, the dynamic programmability may cause more frequent changes in the network configuration, which requires a network verifier to ensure that the changes do not violate forwarding policies. To address this issue, we can leverage existing SDN research work like Consistent Updates [12] to ensure the per-packet consistency to avoid network instability. By tagging each rule with a version number, Consistent Update, a two-phase network protocol can ensure that one exact network configuration consistently processes every packet traversing the network. A unique feature provided by SDN is that self-healing applications can take place at the network layer, or even utilize information from higher layers provided by the global visibility of SDN. Traditional mechanisms, such as the spanning tree, take place at the link layer, which greatly restricts the ability of the self-healing application from reaching an optimal forwarding state.
B. Communication Network Verification
Real-time Verification. The global visibility offered by SDN allows us to verify the entire communication network against security policies (e.g., access control) and network invariants (e.g., loop-freedom and congestion-freedom) to detect cyberthreats and mal-operations. The dynamic programmability of SDN, and the multitude of interacting network applications contributes to changes in the network forwarding behavior. The time-critical nature of microgrid control systems requires us to perform network verification in real time. Analysis of static snapshots of the network state has been used to detect system vulnerabilities and errors [13] - [19] . However, those approaches operate offline, and therefore, detect faults only after they occur. The centralized control and global visibility of SDN allows online verification to check dynamic snapshots. In this work, we develop an SDN-based network verifier as a middle layer between the SDN controller and the underlying communication network. We intercept every network update issued by the SDN controller before it hits the network and verifies its impact on the security policy and network invariants in real time. We first slices the set of possible packets into equivalence classes (ECs), i.e., a set of packets that experiences the same forwarding actions, and the same notion of EC is defined in VeriFlow [20] . For each EC affected by the update, we then build a graph-based model to represent the forwarding behavior based on the topology as well as the local information stored on the SDN switches (e.g., port mapping and rule priorities). We finally traverse every graph to verify user-specified security policies and network invariants (e.g., access control, loop-freedom, absence of black hole, and congestion-freedom). For example, we traverse the directed edges in the forwarding graph using depth-first search to determine whether the packets can be delivered to the destination node, or whether a path contains a loop or a black hole node where all packets are dropped. Such design significantly reduces the size of the affected network. Our verifier contains new algorithms to split the existing ECs into smaller and nonoverlapping ECs and to merge ECs to reduce the time and space complexity for the forwarding graph generation. The design allows us to meet the real-time communication requirement in industrial control systems. The evaluation results are discussed in Section VI-B.
Uncertainty-aware Verification. A microgrid relies on a continuously available communication network to function. Therefore, even short-term and transient communication faults will lead to serious consequences. Errors of transient nature arise from "uncertainty" in message timing because of inevitable communication and processing delays among the different components. Failing to consider the temporal uncertainty can cause many hidden faults during network state changes, e.g., issues that occur during cyber-attacks incident responses, system upgrades, and/or misconfiguration corrections. To model the network temporal uncertainty, we develop an uncertainty-aware network graph that symbolically models the forwarding behavior of packets that arrive before and after an update occurs in the network, until the status of the update is certain (e.g., via acknowledgment or time-out). This model allows us to capture the network uncertainty using a single graph, which represents the entire set of possible network states. By inspecting the graph, we can answer questions such as which state in the network is reliably known, and whether a newly arrived update from an application would cause an inconsistency with in-flight updates.
We conduct a case study of the SDN-based network verification application with experimental results discussed in Section VI-B.
C. Specification-Based Intrusion Detection
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) are widely-used security tools in communication networks. They continuously monitor network activities and generate alarms for malicious cyber-events. However, most commercial IDSes are not capable of monitoring SCADA protocols for suspicious behavior [21] , [22] . This is because the extremely demanding requirements of critical energy infrastructures require us to ensure that the entire system must function correctly under any condition. In traditional communication networks, many applications run outside network operators' control causing difficulty in defining correct operations. Fortunately, microgrids have a small set of applications whose workflows are restricted and controlled by operators. Therefore, taking a specification-based approach to design an IDS for microgrid communication networks is effective. However, development of effective IDS rules requires knowledge of the vulnerabilities in the protocols [23] . That knowledge comes at the cost of extensive vulnerability assessments of protocols and applications. A Specification-based Intrusion Detection System based on Virtualized Utility Networks.
Specification-based IDS takes advantage of the SDN-based communication architecture in various ways. First the SDN technology allows us to effectively slice the physical communication network into several virtualized networks that connect devices and deliver traffic belonging to each critical grid control application, as shown in Figure 3 . The virtualized network slices (1) inherently enhance security with traffic isolation, (2) enable more fine-grained status monitoring, and (3) simplify the labor-intensive protocol vulnerability assessment, i.e., limited to one particular application per virtual network slice.
V. CYBER-PHYSICAL TESTBED FOR MICROGRID OPERATIONS
Applying emerging communication networking technologies like SDN to microgrids calls for a scalable and dependable testing platform to facilitate the transitions from in-house research ideas to real productions. We have developed DSSnet, a cyber-physical microgrid testbed combining electrical power distribution system simulation and SDN emulation to support high-fidelity analysis of SDN-based applications and their impacts on microgrids [4] . In this work, we expand DSSnet by incorporating a communication network operating system in order to facilitate the management and deployment for a microgrid environment.
DSSnet is mainly composed of the following main components as shown in Fig. 4: (1) a container-based SDN emulator, Mininet that allows executing of real SDN software and communication network applications [27] ; (2) an electrical power distribution system simulator, OpenDSS that enables power flow simulation studies [28]; (3) a unique Linux-kernel-based virtual time system for synchronization of the two sub-systems, which significantly enhances the temporal fidelity issues in ordinary co-simulation or hardwarein-the-loop testbeds [27] ; (4) two coordinators for interfacing with the cyber-and physical-side modules and the virtual time system; and (5) a new feature of the distributed SDN control environment, ONOS [9] that provides high-level abstractions and APIs for microgrid control applications to manage, monitor and program the emulated communication network. In this work, we show that the incorporation of ONOS into DSSnet empowers an SDN controlled microgrid through our use cases. An ongoing work is to extend the testbed with physical SDN hardware switches to enable high functional fidelity analysis and evaluation. We have used DSSnet to evaluate various microgrid applications, and a case study of a self-healing application is presented in the next section to demonstrate the microgrid resilience and security enhancement by using SDN.
VI. CASE STUDY
A. Self-Healing Microgrid Application 1) Attack Testing Scenario and Recovery Strategies:
In order to evaluate how SDN network reconfiguration can benefit the microgrid, we consider the centralized control over two DERs in this use case. Specifically, we consider an example microgrid based on the IEEE 13-bus distribution system that includes an additional wind turbine and an additional energy storage device. Figure 5 depicts the test scenario in the perspective of both the power grid and the communication network. Because the wind turbine provides dynamic power generation, we consider a control application that measures the output generated by the wind turbine and subsequently charges and discharges the energy storage device accordingly. This control application serves to maintain voltage stabilization in the microgrid. Communication is sent every 100 ms from the sensors that measure power production to the control center. The control application then computes the balance per phase and sends control commands to the energy storage device.
We consider an attacker with the power to compromise switches and links within the communication network in order to evaluate the benefits provided to network recovery using SDN over traditional approaches. When a switch or link device is compromised, it is considered failed to the network. In this paper, we analyze three recovery strategies to regain connectivity within the network, i.e., we compare SDN enabled self-healing to the traditional Spanning Tree Protocol (STP) as well as the improved Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol (RSTP).
• SDN self-healing works by establishing an "intent" between the control center and the energy storage device.
The intent is established in ONOS and creates a flow rule on each intermediate device to maintain a forwarding path between the control center and the energy storage device using the Dijkstra's all shortest paths algorithm. In the ONOS platform, the controller can sense the topology changes and pass the topology change event to the corresponding applications and the intents registered. As a result, when a link or switch is failed or compromised in a denial-of-service attack, the intent is updated and the connection between the control center and the energy storage device is restored. The mechanism to compute the new path is by running Dijkstra's shortest path algorithm on the updated graph representation of the communication network without the effected edges. In addition, ONOS supports multipath forwarding out of the box, which is an advantage over both STP and RSTP protocols that must build loop free topologies. In contrast to our previous work in [11] where connection is maintained at the application layer, the self-healing mechanism utilized through the ONOS platform is at the network layer focusing on host-to-host self-healing by selecting the shortest path.
• STP creates a spanning tree from a network graph and disables any links forming cycles [29] . STP works by electing a root device and assigning costs to links coming out of the root. As a device receives the costs on its ports to the root, it selects the lowest cost route. Eventually the lowest cost path from any device to the root is kept and transitioned to the forwarding ports in the spanning tree, while the rest of the links are set to be blocked. Messages are periodically exchanged, therefore when the topology changes, the network detects the change and converges to a new network configuration. This requires four missed messages and a listening and learning stage that takes 50 seconds or longer depending on network settings.
• RSTP was designed to shorten the large convergence time in STP [29] . RSTP increases the overhead in the network by enforcing more properties of ports. More overhead however allows for faster convergence after the topology changes by reducing the time needed in listening and learning stages. Convergence time for RSTP can range from 500 ms to 8 s [30] . Figure 6 illustrates the communication network states in terms of forwarding behavior for SDN, RSTP and STP respectively, before and after a cyber-attack that compromises a critical switch. In the SDN-powered network, multipath forwarding is easily enabled as evident by the dotted lines. Upon cyber-attack, the communication network reconfigures (e.g., shortest-path routing algorithm) to reconnect the host to the control center; STP creates a spanning tree with a single route from any two nodes. After the cyber-attack, the network converges to form a new spanning tree. The green node indicates the root after the cyber-attack on the indicated switch.
2) Experiment Setup in DSSnet:
We implemented the control functions in the network emulator as well as the monitor and energy storage device networking applications using TCP. At time t=2, we emulated a cyber-attack by destroying an intermediate link between the control center and the energy storage device. In the SDN case, we installed a host-tohost intent between the control center and the energy storage device in ONOS. In the no attack case, we used an ONOS default application: reactive forwarding, to establish connections between hosts. Indeed, we could have used either of the other protocols to have achieved the same result. When we utilized STP and RSTP, which are supported in DSSnet, the default OpenFlow reference controller in Mininet was used with a one-millisecond flow entry timeout enabling the self-healing to take effect immediately.
The wind turbine is assumed to have a 3 MW capacity with fixed power factor 0.9. The variability of wind power is shown in Figure 7(a) . In order to accommodate the volatile outputs of wind power, the energy storage device with rated power output 2 MW is utilized to level the total power generation, i.e., the energy storage is guided by control center to charge and discharge. For compensating the line loss, we consider a loss factor 1.02 for discharging and 0.98 for charging.
3) Experimental Results: We plot the single-phase voltages at bus 675 and 680 in Figure 7 (b) and 7(c) in four scenarios, i.e., no attack, STP, RSTP and the SDN enabled selfhealing mechanism. When the system operates normally with no attack, we can see that the voltage stability is ensured. Since STP takes 50 seconds to converge with the default parameters, we are unable to observe a convergence in the time that the microgrid operation is simulated. Essentially, the result represents the equivalent performance as if there was no alternative path from the control center to the energy storage device.
With SDN-enabled self-healing capabilities, the network can regain connection before microgrid operations are affected. This can be seen by the red line in the Bus 675 and 680 graphs. The red line overlaps the black line with some exceptions due to variability of emulation. When at time t=2 s, we see in both the STP and RSTP cases that the voltage quickly drops. Power supplies provided by the microgrid becomes unstable at this point due to the voltage loss. At time t=4.7 s when RSTP converges, the communication is able to regain functionality, all lost messages are retransmitted and the system resumes proper operation. At this point, we observe that the voltage of the system returns to normal. We also note here that the convergence time of RSTP can be larger depending on network topology, and settings on the networking devices. Our results use the default operating settings. STP failing to converge within the time simulated in the power network shows that without network restoration the microgrid experiences a prolonged state of voltage loss causing unstable operating conditions.
Due to the fast recovery time of the SDN mechanism, no adverse effect can be observed in microgrid operations. This is because the TCP communication protocol can resend lost data in a timely manner. The results of STP show that it is not a good choice for a network to utilize a control application at the millisecond or even second level. The results of RSTP show that the microgrid can quickly reach an unsafe state given the convergence time. Therefore, for power applications that have less strict timing requirements, RSTP may be acceptable. However, in cases like this one, RSTP does not provide adequate recovery times from cyber-attacks or communication network faults.
The overhead in terms of number of messages required in the SDN solution is bound by the size of the old path plus the size of the new path, plus the number of link failed messages to the controller. If the new path does not overlap the existing path, then a message from the controller to each switch in both old and new paths needs to occur. The old path receives notification to delete flows while the new path receives the new forwarding rules. On the other hand, if the old path and the new path overlap, then there would be fewer messages needed. Alternatively, if timeout is used on the flow rules, then the old path can remove the rules no longer needed automatically without receiving messages from the controller. In the traditional spanning tree mechanisms, messages (bridge protocol data units) are continuously transmitted at a specified interval between switches to inform each other of link status, the default is one message every two seconds per switch.
In terms of scalability, since SDN can utilize multiple distributed controllers, the number of required messages (per controller) is bounded by the number of switches that each controller is responsible for managing, i.e., a network with 90 switches and 3 controllers would enable each controller to manage 30 switches, while adding two more controllers would reduce the number of managed switches to 18 each. We utilize three controllers in our case. In conclusion, the self-healing ability of SDN, provided by ONOS, presents an easy way to deploy replacement of traditional network recovery protocols with faster recovery time, which also illustrates the benefits that an SDN enabled microgrid can provide.
B. Communication Network Verification Application
We also developed a communication network verifier as an SDN controller application to verify that distinct connectivitybased properties hold true across the entire microgrid. The case study demonstrates the performance improvement including the faster verification speed as well as better error coverage and detection accuracy, which satisfies the real-time and critical nature of microgrid communication networks.
We expanded the campus microgrid communication network scenario with more building-level and sub-buildinglevel routers. We emulated a fat-tree topology consisting of one SDN controller, 5 building-level routers, 10 sub-building-level routers, and 50 end-devices in Mininet. The SDN controller ran a shortest path routing application and a load balancing application to mimic the typical campus network routing behaviors. We ran each set of experiments with four update mechanisms for comparison: (1) our network verifier to verify that no loops exist in any communication paths ("NWVloop-free"); (2) our network verifier to verify that no loops and black holes exist in any communication paths ("NWVloop-blackhole-free"); (3) Consistent Updates [12] , an existing SDN network update scheme that ensures any packet/flow is processed by either a new or an old configuration, but never by a mix of the two ("Consistent Updates"); and (4) Incremental Consistent Updates [31] , a variation of the Consistent Updates scheme that trades time against flow table space ("Incremental CU"). We set the delay between the controller issuing an update and the router finishing the update installation to a normal distribution with 100 ms mean and 25 ms jitter, to mimic a dynamic campus network environment. Initially, we enabled 12 routers and randomly selected 25 sender-receiver pairs to transmit TCP traffic. After one minute, we enabled the remaining 3 routers. The topology change triggered new rules being installed for load balancing. Note that the traffic eventually is evenly distributed across all links because of the load balancing application. We measured the completion time of updating each communication path, and repeated each experiment 8 times. Figure 8 shows the cumulative distribution functions (CDF) for all four scenarios.
We observed that our verifier managed to quickly complete all the network update verification within 200 ms and required far less update completion time than both CU and incremental CU. For 97% of the updates, the speed improvement is more than 250 ms. This is because our verification algorithm allows packets to be handled by a mixture of old and verified new rules. Accordingly, we can apply any verified updates without explicitly waiting for irrelevant updates. In addition, our algorithm enables the aggregation of more updates to individual network devices.
To demonstrate the improvement of the detected error coverage, we integrated an uncertainty model into our SDN-based network verifier. Using the same fat-tree topology, we verified the network updates against forwarding loops, black holes, and out-of-order updates. Three sets of measurement data were collected: (1) flow entries at the controller with the network verifier ("NV"), (2) flow entries (with confirmations) at the controller with the temporal-uncertainty-aware network verifier ("TUA-NV"), and (3) flow entries installed at the routers. All three sets of data were then fed into the network verifier to generate the error detection reports. Since traces from the switches represent the actual states of the network, they serve as the ground truth. The number of missed errors (false positives) and the number of incorrect alerts (false negatives) are shown in Table I .
We observed that while both designs have missed errors and wrong alerts in this scenario, TUA-NV has much higher detection accuracy than NV. TUA-NV was able to capture 503 more real errors than NV did (further investigation with the router logs revealed that all the errors are black-hole errors), and experienced 24 fewer wrong alerts. With the evaluation results, we are confident that the temporal uncertainty-aware network verifier will be able to capture more transient network errors when it is integrated into a production system, making it better suited to the microgrid control network preventing critical messages from being dropped or delayed.
VII. RELATED WORK
Industrial Control System (ICS) Security has been addressed by several industrial and government-led efforts, including the development of NERC's cybersecurity standards for control systems in the electrical sector [32] ; NIST's guide to ICS security [33] ; and ISA-SP 99, a security standard in manufacturing industrial controls [34] . The Department of Energy has also led security efforts by establishing the national SCADA testbed program [35] and developing a 10-year outline for securing control systems [36] , [37] . Although those efforts have created awareness of security issues within ICSes and helped operators design security policies, the recommendations and standards have not considered technical details of the problems that arise when ICSes are under attack. Researchers have investigated techniques for securing ICS. Firewalls are widely deployed in ICSes to provide finegrained access control at single devices, but inconsistency and conflicts of rules are observed at the global level [38] - [40] . Intrusion detection systems (IDSes) are another common security tool used in ICSes; they monitor network activities and provide timely alerts for attempted cyber-attacks. Most commercial IDSes are not capable of monitoring SCADA protocols for suspicious behavior [21] , [22] , and the development of effective IDS rules requires knowledge of the vulnerabilities in the protocols at the cost of extensive vulnerability assessments of protocols and applications.
SDN Applications in Smart Grid is an emerging research topic. Recent works include: applications in substation automation [41] , [42] ; reliability evaluation [43] ; quality of service (QoS) optimization [44] - [47] ; fast failover mechanism [42] , [44] ; an energy sector SDN-enabled Ethernet switch [48] ; and a co-simulation testbed using PowerWorld and Mininet [49] . However, those works are still in their very initial stages and do not particularly focus on cyber security. Ren et al. [50] studied SDN applications for microgrid resilience enhancement with a hardware-in-the-loop testbed. The microgrid applications we have investigated focus on cyber-security and cyber-resilience in adversarial environments.
SDN Security and Resilience Enforcement is another emerging research topic [8] , [51] . Recent advances primarily focus on security enforcement frameworks [52] - [57] . FortNOX [52] enables rule conflict detection in the controller. FRESCO [53] offers an application development framework with modular security service composition. Rosemary [58] introduces a container-based architecture to isolate SDN applications for security enhancement. SPHINX [57] uses flow graphs to detect security threats on network topology and forwarding behavior. We can leverage those solutions to design our secure SDN controller and applications. Another line of inquiry focuses on network verification. Researchers statically analyze snapshots of the network state to detect system vulnerabilities and faults [13] - [19] . However, those approaches operate offline, and, thus, find errors only after they occur. Online verification tools are also developed [20] , [57] - [60] to check dynamic snapshots. However, none of the existing tools take into consideration network temporary uncertainty. Heller et al. [61] presents a big picture of a cross-layer diagnostic framework that we are going to explore as an essential component towards that goal.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Microgrids are deemed as the building blocks of a Smart Grid. Conceivably, a Smart Grid will evolve as a grid of microgrids. However, microgrid operations are threatened by the over-growing threats of cyber-attacks besides conventional physical contingencies, which impedes the proliferation of microgrids. We present an SDN-enabled microgrid infrastructure with applications towards achieving resilient and secure operations in the face of various cyber threats. Ongoing and future work include exploring cross-layer cyber-attack detection/mitigation technologies and transforming the in-house research ideas that are evaluated by DSSnet to the IIT campus microgrid for field demonstration and validation. 
